The CFSP as it is defined by the Treaty, includes “all questions related to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, …it includes humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management…”. The CFSP’s scope is therefore very broad and the objective of the Common defence is set down as a possibility implemented following the decision of the Council of Ministers (further in text – “Council”).

Such a decision should normally define the objectives of the operation and the conditions under which the High Representative, who would then chair the Political and Security Committee (exercise political and the strategic management of the operation), would be tasked with the implementation of the operation. This makes the system inapplicable to the situation which requires rapid and effective decision making, and a clear chain of command, identifiable by military leaders.  

2) Acute lack of sufficient military capabilities for managing the crises affecting EU directly (Balkans crisis), as well as the attack of 11 September (where the question arose whether certain actions, and if so which ones, could be undertaken by the other Member states in the event of similar attack against a member state) showed that Petersberg tasks do not provide enough means to manage the danger which might arise.

Eleven Member states, though, are already bound by a mutual undertaking to provide assistance under Article 5 of the Washington treaty (NATO) and ten of them also under Article V of the Brussels Treaty (WEU).(!!!)

3) Though at its meeting in Helsinki (Dec. 1999) the European Council established its “headline goal” to be achieved by 2003: the Union should be able to deploy rapidly (50.000-60.000 forces within 60 days) and then sustain (for at least a year) forces capable of full range of Petersberg tasks, careful analysis shows, that the adequate measures have not yet been taken.

The critical shortfalls are:

-         The command, control and communication system

-         Strategic intelligence and the surveillance and protection of troops commited

-         Strategic transport

-         Effective commitment capability

Making good these deficiencies requires investment, which may be obtained

(A) by an increase in defence budget, and

(B) by better use of recourses.

4) Group should take into account that there is in fact no cooperation on armaments at Union level. Some member states are involved in purely intergovernmental forms of cooperation, which, however, cover only some aspects of armament policy. As well – the total defence budgets of the fifteen Member States are reaching around 2/3 of US defence budget), which shows that efforts needed not only on budget level, but more at the level of procurement so as to achieve economies of scale and at the level of arms research and development.

Thus the group might consider whether and which forms of cooperation on armaments could be incorporated into the Treaty:

-         Cooperation between all Member states?

-         Voluntary cooperation with accession criteria (strict criteria which Member states must meet if they are to be allowed to participate in the European Union’s defence policy, and a “pact” which they would to comply with thereafter)?

-         Also: whether there is a need for an arms agency (research, development, acquisition).

5) The points developed in previous sections above show that Member States’ readiness to make progress in the defence sphere is not uniform.

The Group has to deal with question – how to enshrine in the Treaty specific forms of cooperation between certain Member states, allowing some Member states to undertake an operation which would benefit from the implicit support or the constructive abstention of the others (which might not wish to subscribe or might not yet have the sufficient military capabilities to do so), and would be considered as a European Union collective defence operation.